Mahinda Rajapaksa, Sri Lanka’s president, will go down in history as a hero. In a span of about two years, his government successfully defeated and disarmed the Liberation of Tamil Tigers Eelam (LTTE), a brutal outfit of insurgents that terrorized Sri Lanka for about a quarter of a century. However, this victory came at an enormous cost. Tens of thousands of innocent Tamil civilians lost their lives, and hundreds of thousands of displaced civilians remain detained in camps in the North of the country. The government refuses to release these detainees until they are screened for links to the Tamil Tigers and the reconstruction of their villages are complete. Conditions in these camps are deplorable, with poor water supply and only little dry rations.
Now re-elected for another term as President, Mr. Rajapaksa needs to clean up his act and needs to do this quickly. Though most Tamils despise the LTTE, their ostensible ideal of a Tamil state remains popular amongst many who have suffered decades of discrimination by the Sinhalese majority. Despite poor voter turnout in the northern Tamil areas, the recent presidential elections saw most Tamils supporting the detained army general, Sarath Fonseka, who portrayed himself as the leader that would allow a greater measure of self-rule for the Tamils. Observers agree that some measure of Tamil autonomy is now necessary for stability in Sri Lanka. To achieve this goal it is imperative that Mr. Rajpaksa realize that Sri Lanka’s ethnic problems require both a political solution and a humanitarian one. The 13th Amendment of the Sri Lankan constitution calls for this by recommending devolution of power to provinces. Given this, it is unfortunate that Mr. Rajapaksa dismissed any federal solution to assuage Tamil grievances; rather, he claims, Tamils only want to be resettled in their homes after the war.
Mr. Rajapaksa’s government does not seem to be faring well on the humanitarian front either. In March this year, the Sri Lankan government decided that the Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP), a UN coordinated aid effort, was useless. Instead Mr. Rajapaksa wants aid to be channeled through a special task force headed by his brother Mr. Basil Rajpaksa. In his defence, aid duplication is often a problem and impedes the speedy recovery of war-torn regions. Nonetheless, this confusion has resulted in donor fatigue. Donors do not know where to send aid and are sceptical of a government that is run like a family-business venture. One of Mr. Rajapaksa’s brothers is the Secretary Of Defense, another is a senior adviser, and many members of his extended family work in senior government positions.
While allegations of alleged war crimes still remain, Mr. Rajapaksa can do a lot more to bolster his nationalist cause by making a few concessions to the Tamils. Some efforts have been made to this end. Suggestions have been made of a new upper house of Parliament and the government is stepping up the recruitment of Tamils into the police force. Yet, none of these will deliver a long-lasting solution to the Tamil problem. Mr. Rajapaksa runs the risk of making the same mistake that was made in Bosnia by the international community: all efforts are directed toward ameliorating the effects of the conflict rather than treating its causes. The problem, which cries out for a political solution, is treated as just another humanitarian crisis.
