The cherished veneer of stability that blankets China’s politics was broken this week, when one of the most controversial candidates for the next Politburo was stripped of his positions and reprimanded by senior leaders, amid allegations of corruption and abuse of power among his subordinates.
Bo Xilai, the former top official in the vast south-western city of Chongqing, had until this week been one of the few politicians in China to inspire genuine popularity among his supporters. His colleagues favour a bland uniform style, their words, clothes, and fancy Western watches all largely interchangeable. They prefer political and ideological disputes to be settled behind closed doors, leaving only a unanimous set of slogans to be presented to the public. But Bo was quite different, affecting a more populist style that brought about both his rise and his fall. He made his name with highly publicised campaigns against ‘black society’, the mafias that put bullets in many heads. Unfortunately, it was never quite clear what criminal activities had been conducted on such a vast scale as to warrant such a campaign.
More telling was Bo’s attempt to revive the mass rallies of the Cultural Revolution, an era associated with excitement as much as with terror. He drew crowds of thousands to wave red flags and sing hymns to Mao and sent mass-texts to Chongqing residents with quotes from the Great Helmsman, earning himself the contempt of China’s liberals.
Bo brought politics back to the people. His politics appealed to what one might cautiously describe as China’s conservatives, if only in so far as they look for solutions from the past. Their beliefs are a mixed bag of left-wing economic populism, Maoist nostalgia, evocations of ‘traditional Chinese values’ and the occasional outburst of xenophobic nationalism. Their views are expressed in countless political websites as well as in more mainstream publications such as the Global Times.
Bo Xilai’s dismissal brings a reminder that pro-democracy liberals are far from the only political force in China to give the party trouble. The same left-wing groups that lionised Bo for his efforts in Chongqing lambast Party officials for being slaves to corporations. Officials are also being called spineless for their inability to stand up to Western and Japanese aggression. It was almost certainly to avoid such accusations of weakness that a swathe of left-wing websites were temporarily blocked following Bo’s dismissal.
The real question is whether these moves against conservative groups will translate into real gains for China’s more liberal elements, such as Bo Xilai’s rival, Wang Yang. That remains to be seen, but do not expect any significant liberalisation merely because Bo has been removed. His mistake was not the ideology he promoted, but the populist manner in which he sought personal power.
Bo coveted support among the public, rather than through the back-room negotiations long favoured by the party, and in doing so threatened to upset the delicate balance of power that has kept Chinese politics stable since the Tiananmen Square massacre. Whatever ideological path China follows over the next decade, it will be continue to be decided behind closed doors.
