When David Cameron announced the War on Terror in North Africa would “last decades”, he was less stating a fact than describing a policy. Defence analysts the world over pricked up their ears at the news that North Africa was likely to be this young decade’s theatre of war. Mali’s ongoing conflict has made sporadic appearances in international news, most notably when the rebels seized Timbuktu in May 2012. However it dramatically returned to our news feeds as the French intervention in Mali coincided with the hostage crisis in the Amenas Gas Field in Algeria. These events set the confrontational tone for many news outlets analysis of North African conflicts, casting a simple narrative of Islamists fighting local Governments. In reality, this narrative will serve only to undermine efforts to resolve Mali’s complex conflict and address the broader questions of Terrorism in North Africa.
This oversimplification of Mali’s conflict into a simple story of Islamist aggression may be an effective way to sell newspapers, but is fundamentally flawed. First it ignores the role that longer history to Saharan independence movements. Following decolonisation Tuareg groups found themselves divided between Mediterranean Arabic states and West African Sahel states, often badly underrepresented in governments. Independence movements, such as the MNLA, are comparatively secular and are willing to negotiate on some form of devolved government for Malian Tuaregs. Second it treats all Islamic groups as homogenous. Not only are their considerable splits in provenance between groups such as Ansar Dine, which represent home grown Islamism and are heavily focused on Malian issues, and AQIM, which is more influenced by Al Qaeda influence. To talk of a single rebellion neglects the significant infighting between groups and misses opportunities to negotiate with and understand the differing goals of Mali’s groups.
Second France’s intervention with the support of the UN community and ECOWAS does not represent a fully planned and considered operation. France’s hand was forced by the rapid successes of rebel groups in Mali. Faced with intervention or the total victory of rebel groups, France was rushed into an intervention. It now privately admits militia groups have proven to be better equipped, disciplined and motivated than expected. It may well prove successful in driving the rebels from town they have captured, but stamping out the insurgency in this vast desert is an entirely different prospect. Moreover the comparative weakness of the Malian army and state calls into question the efficacy of an extensive US Military aid programme. North Africa following the Arab Spring and the fall of Gadhafi has become a considerable area of relatively lawless desert with the free movement of arms and experienced rebels. These factors significantly diminish the ability of Western nations to project influence in a sustained manner through military force.
These two points underline the contradiction at the heart of the West’s policy and new coverage of Mali’s “War on Terror”. While media narratives and political statements may not appear significant, in reality they have committed to a particular view of Mali’s rebels, as international Islamic extremists oppressing Mali. As such they are unwilling to negotiate with them. In so doing western government have significant limited their ability to manoeuvre and recognise the legitimate and complex questions of sovereignty in the Sahara. Combine this narrow political strategy with a daunting military problem in subjugating and controlling Northern Mali, and the narratisation of Mali’s war becomes even more significant. Even as defence establishment’s around the world consider the difficulties of the War on Terror’s second decade in North Africa, they have already tied one hand behind their back.
