As the world agonised over crises in Gaza and Egypt, the Democratic Republic of Congo added another chapter to its bloody 21st century history. Since 1994 over 5.4 million people have been killed in sporadic conflicts throughout the Congo.
The violence has been most acute in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu. Known collectively as the Kivus, this region borders both Rwanda and Uganda and often suffers fallout from events in those two tumultuous countries.
On 23rd March 2009, a peace accord technically brought an end to conflict in the region, but the area has remained in the hands of a wide variety of rebel groups. On 6th July, however, the M23, named after the unenforced conditions of the peace accord, seized the town of Bungana. Despite the efforts of the Congolese Army, the UN MONUSCO peacekeepers, and tepid international condemnation, by 20th July the regionally significant town of Goma was in rebel hands.
Once it had secured a promise of negotiations, the M23 retreated from Goma, but maintained positions within clear striking distance. What is clear however is that in the East Kivus the M23 hold the military whip hand over the Congolese Army, the FARDC. Despite M23’s relative unpopularity with local people, they are able to operate with relative impunity in the Kivus.
It was a complex set of conditions that led the government’s legitimacy and sovereignty to collapse so completely in a key region of the DRC. This current crisis is not so much an individual event but part of a humanitarian catastrophe that is historical and self perpetuating.
Understanding the provenance and principles of the M23 and other rebel movements in the DRC is key to grasping the roots of the conflict. Following the spread of violence from Rwanda in 1994 into the region, a series of movements supported by Rwandan Tutsis developed in the Kivus.
Ostensibly they aimed to protect “Tutsi” Banyamulenge Congolese from both local and state oppression. Many however developed into quasi-state-like entities themselves, exploiting the rich mineral resources of the area. The M23 therefore has little incentive to lay down its arms and accept a quiet integration into the national army.
Previous attempts have resulted in the maintenance of an unofficial parallel command structure within the army for M23 units. There are various factors for this unwillingness to surrender their power. First they and their leadership have a long history of antagonism with the Congolese state. Second rebellion represents a profitable enterprise for its leadership. And thirdly, legitimacy is better conveyed through the barrel of a gun than the ballot box in the Kivus. To surrender arms is to abdicate to one of the multitude of other rebel groups in the region.
The regional context has also played a significant role in maintaining the instability. Following the mass emigration from Rwanda during the 1994 genocide, significant groups of genocidal insurgents took up residence in East Congo and began launching raids into Rwanda. The stateless area in the Kivus has consistently provided a base for insurgent groups aimed at displacing the post–genocide Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) Government. Consequently Rwanda has interfered both directly and indirectly: by sponsoring rebel groups to weaken the anti-Rwandan insurgency.
The genocidal Interhamwe militias based in Congo have been supported by successive Congolese governments, both as a means of control over Congolese Tutsis and a buffer against Rwandan aggression. This proxy war has left a large, rich area essentially stateless. Rwanda’s interference in the region has been predicated on the need to protect its borders, the mineral wealth of the Kivus and desire for a possible Greater Rwandan project incorporating parts of the Congo. Rwanda therefore has multiple incentives to continue funding rebel movements such as the M23. Consequently the Kivus are prone to rebel insurgency because of regional interest and operations in the area.
Finally, the crisis of legitimacy in the Congo represents a substantial barrier to real compromise and progress, both between regional powers and rebel groups. The November 2011 Elections aimed to create an atmosphere of trust and legitimate government yet instead they ended with substantial uncertainty, riots in Kinshasa and the opposition leader, Etienne Tshisekedi under house arrest. International observers expressed profound disappointment in the standards of the election, but were not prepared to intervene.
While fraud was significant, it was arguably not of a scale sufficient to change the overall Presidential result from Kabila to Tshisekedi. However the uncertainty merely served to further undermine confidence in central government. In essence, it widened the gap between central government and peripheral movements, as both claimed the election result validated their movements. This crisis of authority further weakened the strength of the ballot box in the Kivus and pushed further power towards those who possess the greatest military strength. Rather than earning sovereignty through the votes, the disputed elections legitimised the seizure of power by force of arms. The consequence is a continual stream of uprisings and violence in the peripheral regions of the Congo.
When news of violence in the Kivus broke in the international media, there was a grim inevitability about it. The Kivus represent one of the most unstable regions in central Africa, part of a nexus of rebel movements running from Congo, through northern Uganda and into South Sudan. These stateless rebel areas are controlled by force of arms.
Many of the rebel movements involved lack the popular legitimacy or resource base to force their agenda to the table, but central government lacks either the force or political power to snuff them out. So rebellion smoulders away with sporadic outbreaks of violence and consistent human rights abuses on all sides.
It seems as if Congo is doomed to repeat the same cycles of violence that have persisted, aided and abetted by regional and international actors, since independence. Until central government in the Congo seizes real authority and legitimacy, it is hard to imagine the cycle being broken. When rebel movements are described it is easy to imagine an active war with clear goals. The reality is much harder to describe.
Whilst the M23 has some ideology, it is also part of a chain of rebel movements stretching back into the 1990s. Rebellion is almost a way of life in North and South Kivu. In the words of Jeffrey Gettleman, “There is a very simple reason why some of Africa’s bloodiest, most brutal wars never seem to end. They are not really wars at all”. The truth is nobody has claimed sovereignty in the Kivus. As long as that is the case, people will try to claim it by force of arms.
