It’s 8am in Taipei, on the 24th November 2022. This morning as I walk to class, negotiating my way around the noodle carts and motorbikes parked half-way out into the pavement, I am stopped at the crossroads by a local election candidate, brandishing a loudspeaker in one hand and a foam finger pointer in the other. A couple of campaign volunteers lean out of their retro-fitted pick-up truck, handing morning commuters leaflets and badges with a manga-style drawing of their candidate giving a big thumbs up: “讚! zan!”, or “great!” in Mandarin. As I flip the badge over between my fingers, I can’t help but compare the festive scene to our elections back home in the UK. What would my MP look like manga-style on a badge?
Throughout my year living in Taipei, I was repeatedly struck by the vibrancy of Taiwanese political culture. As a fledgling democracy caught between the US and China, it is perhaps not surprising that people here take voting so seriously. But what caught my attention most was how politicians, like my local candidate, were always out on the streets and listening to their constituents. Coming from the UK, where it often feels like politicians are chronically disengaged from their voters, watching Taiwanese democracy in action was as bittersweet as it was inspiring.
Just over a year later, Taiwan’s 2024 presidential elections this January saw a series of “firsts”: Taiwan’s voters elected current vice-president Lai Ching-te as president, winning the Democratic People’s Party (DPP) a historically unprecedented third term in office. Joining his party in parliament is also the island’s first openly LGBTQ+ legislator. Most crucially, despite the presidential victory, major DPP losses in the district elections means Taiwan faces a hung parliament for the first time since 2008. Having reached 8 seats in the Legislative Yuan, political newcomer Ko Wen-je and his party the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) will now become a gatekeeper to passing legislation, with both the KMT and DPP vying for an alliance with him. One thing is for certain – Taiwanese politics will look very different in the coming years, and the world will be watching.
The 2024 calendar is full of significant elections, but many have pointed to Taiwan’s election as critically important. Just across the Taiwan Strait is the People’s Republic of China, which states that the self-governing island is an “inseparable” part of its territory. On the other hand, after more than seventy years of self-rule, Taiwan increasingly sees itself as an independent entity, with a unique blend of cultures, a democratic government, and its own national identity. Amidst tense US-China relations, fears of war and its potential global impacts have been splashed across frontpages worldwide.
But this narrative Western media tells us of Taiwan, a story of clashing egos and superpowers staking their claims, has blinded much of the world to a simple fact – Taiwan isn’t just a prize piece on a giant geopolitical chessboard; it is home to 23 million people. Whilst the world watched anxiously to see if voters would swing towards the “pro-China” Nationalist Party (KMT) or forge on behind the “pro-Independence” DPP, Taiwanese people were focussed on their own priorities: low wages, high house prices, and social security – in short, the policies that affect people’s everyday lives. To fully grasp the results of this election, and the implications it may have diplomatically, we must dig beneath sensationalist rhetoric and understand what it is like to live as a Taiwanese person in 2024.
So how can we understand these results? Party affiliation in Taiwan has long been dominated by identity. The KMT’s base are immigrants from Mainland China and their descendants, who maintain a strong sense of “Chinese” identity. On the other hand, the DPP has its roots in the Taiwanese democracy movement. Touting progressive values, its supporters have been younger and prefer to identify as “Taiwanese”. Although the “identity question” undoubtedly still plays a role in voter decision making – many younger, Taiwanese-identifying voters would be hard-pressed to vote for the KMT – the growing misalignment between the district vote and the presidential vote, as well as the increase in votes for the TPP, reflects how many young voters are prioritising economic policy, and seeking a change in the dynamics driving Taiwanese politics.
Since no party won a majority of seats in the Legislative Yuan, governance over the next four years will indeed look very different. Despite clinging on to the presidency, the DPP has not entirely managed to escape the “curse” of a third term in government. Serious losses in the district elections have left them with 50 seats to the KMT’s 51. That means passing legislation for both parties will hinge on their ability to strike a deal with the TPP led by Ko Wen-je. Having achieved eight seats in the Legislative Yuan, Ko may be the biggest winner of this year’s election. Many young Taiwanese in the high-tech sector were driven away from the DPP by rising house prices and falling wages, and drawn to Ko’s promise of finding a middle-ground on cross-strait relations. As the centre of gravity for his party-cum-social movement, Ko will play the role of “Kingmaker”, with both the DPP and KMT in with a chance of courting him on a policy-by-policy basis. Ko has history with both parties – he even attempted to form a joint ticket with the KMT last November – so which party he will choose to collaborate with remains up in the air.
The biggest risk for Taiwanese democracy is a weak government. For the past eight years, the DPP majority has been able to push through legislation with relatively little difficulty. Now, effective governance will depend on cross-party collaboration. Voters will recall with trepidation Taiwan’s last divided government in 2008, overshadowed by hostile inter-party relations. However, Taiwan watchers have pointed to important social reforms, such as gender equality legislation, that came out of this period. More negotiation on core issues could lead to novel solutions and consensus forming. How the main parties communicate with each other over the next few months, and whether the TPP can maintain its independence as a “Third Front”, will give crucial clues as to the likelihood of this scenario.
With the threat of Chinese intervention, voters have also had a choice to make about which party they believe offers the best strategy for maintaining the status quo. The KMT prioritises warmer cross-strait relations, playing to domestic concerns of job losses following a suspension of favourable trade conditions by the Mainland in December. DPP supporters believe the party’s strategy of strengthening ties with the US and global democratic community offers the best deterrent against military intervention. Lai’s election promises a continuation of his predecessor Tsai Ing-wen’s diplomatic policy and is evidence that many voters support Taiwan taking a more prominent role on the world stage.
Last week the US senate had passed a $95 billion aid package, including $4.3 billion earmarked for the defence of Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific region. This example of all-to-rare bipartisan collaboration is encouraging news for Lai, who sees the US-Taiwan security partnership as crucial for maintaining the island’s freedom.
But Lai is not without his critics, and anti-American sentiment is on the rise. TSMC, Taiwan’s world-class semiconductor chip manufacturers, made a recent decision to establish a factory in the US, which drew accusations that the US was seeking to “hollow out Taiwan”. Moreover, as the DPP refuses to accept the 1992 Consensus, which states that there is only “one China”, it is likely Beijing will continue to refuse to communicate with a DPP administration. Under these circumstances, it is hard to see how Lai will fulfil his commitment to developing cross-strait relations.
It is important to beware of sensationalist articles about Lai. It is true that he was not China’s favoured candidate – the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has attacked Lai as a “destroyer of peace” and claim that Lai and the DPP “do not represent mainstream public opinion on the island”. When it comes to talking about Taiwan’s international status, wording is crucial, and in the past Lai has been more provocative on the subject than his predecessor Tsai Ing-wen. Particularly, Lai’s 2017 comments in which he described himself as “a pragmatic worker for Taiwanese independence” crossed Beijing’s red-line of advocating for the formal declaration of the island’s independence. However, on the campaign trail Lai has stuck to Tsai’s formula, treading a line of ambiguity to insist that there is no need to declare independence since Taiwan is “already an independent sovereign state named The Republic of China, Taiwan”. This, too, is testament to the culture of listening in Taiwanese politics. Surveys show most Taiwanese people want to maintain the status-quo with China, and as a representative of the whole nation Lai has committed to govern by majority public opinion, whatever his own views may be.
What we do know is that Lai’s election does not immediately increase the risk of conflict with the PRC. Beijing’s response so far has been measured, simply reiterating their position that the results: “will not change the basic fact that Taiwan is part of China and there is only one China in the world.” Amid record youth unemployment, high inflation and corruption in the army, Beijing’s priority over the near future is to maintain external stability amid economic headwinds domestically. A split government will be a big reassurance to Xi, as decisions on cross-strait policy and military spending will likely hit a stalemate in the Legislative Yuan. That’s not to say Beijing won’t be keeping up its pressure on the island. All-out military intervention might be off the cards, but a foreign policy dispute could provide Xi a welcome distraction from China’s internal dilemmas.
As we reflect on these elections, we can of course learn a lot about the current social and political trends at play in Taiwan, from growing disillusionment with the 2 major political parties to the focus on day to day issues. But for me, the real lessons to be learned go beyond the results, and instead come from Taiwanese democracy as a whole. For sure, politics in Taiwan is not perfect; online misinformation, hyper-partisanism, and distrust of the political establishment have emerged here as they have in all modern democracies. However, Taiwanese people’s commitment to the democratic process, with a 72% turnout rate, stands in stark opposition to the US and the UK. Looking back to when I frequently saw candidates out on the streets, it occurs to me that it is precisely politicians’ commitment to being amongst their voters that makes politics feel more participative there. If you saw your representative chatting to voters on your street corner, you would probably be more inclined to think they were in touch with local issues too. There is a lot for UK politicians to take away from how the Taiwanese do democracy. Maybe it’s time for some manga-style Starmer badges?
Examining western attitudes to apartheid
“I am the grandchild of Nelson Mandela” is a common expression amongst social justice activists from South Africa. The recent case brought by the country against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is inextricably linked to its past fight for justice and decolonisation. For many, the case is a moral beacon which challenges the Western hegemony over global politics – but what can South Africa’s history teach us about the present?
In South Africa, apartheid began in 1948. At the time, many white South Africans (‘Afrikaners’) felt that white domination was being threatened by an increasing number of black migrant workers in the country’s industrial centres; the ruling minority insisted that there should be a market for employment in which non-whites could not compete. The solution was a legislative effort to extend segregation, which had so far been the social custom, through a parliament in which non-whites could not vote. Apartheid was the legislative part of a system that exploited black labour and concentrated money and power in the hands of the white elite.
By 1964, 3 million white South Africans controlled the affairs of 11 million black Africans, 1.5 million persons of mixed blood and half a million Asians. By the beginning of the 1980s, South Africa had the highest wealth inequality in the world, with 40 per cent of the population earning just 6 percent of the national income.
Looking through the archives of The New York Times between 1960-80, there are a few key ways in which apartheid was allowed to persist until the start of the 21st century.
The first was clever marketing. Afrikaners considered their rule as akin to an objective tribunal, like the Supreme Court. The United Party, although not in favour of apartheid, argued that the role of the white government was to stand “above partisan passion and…defend minority rights, however transiently unpopular, from an excessive ‘democracy’ of a thrusting majority”. This was compounded by open fearmongering about what ‘black rule’ could mean for the country. In 1977, the Foreign Minister of Apartheid South Africa travelled to the United States to lobby Congressmen, businessmen and Senators against supporting ‘one-man, one-vote’, the slogan used by the anti-apartheid movement. The same slogan used by the civil rights movement in the United States in the 1960s, he said, would bring “violence, bloodshed and eventual destruction of the white population”.
The next was an obsession with discussing the way in which apartheid would end and detracting from the vile racism and inherent violence of white minority rule. In 1986, four years before the negotiations to end apartheid, a New York Times opinion writer wrote: “None but the glib can foresee an easy, painless transition…oppression has gone on so long that even those most patient of people, South African blacks, are now smouldering with bitterness.”
The idea that apartheid could only be dismantled through excessive violence allowed many to continue supporting the status quo, even as increasing state violence was required to maintain the apartheid regime. When 7,000 black protesters rose up in opposition to the ‘pass-book’, a government ID that defined your rights according to your race, police fired indiscriminately into the crowd and killed 69 people. UMkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the paramilitary arm of the African National Congress (ANC), was formed in the wake of this atrocity, now known as the Sharpeville massacre.
Pervading this discussion were racist narratives that suggested that black Africans were not ready to be given sovereignty and that they were too tribal, or inherently violent, to form stable societies. Many colonial enterprises relied on similar notions of stewardship, which gave Europeans the right to control African affairs. An opinion article in The New York Times in 1962 entitled ‘Africa Struggles with Democracy’ repeats long-cited ideas about the backwards, tribalistic people of the continent. Seemingly legitimate concerns about the rise of ‘strong man’ rule even suggested that Africans were somehow predisposed to it: “Now, having become the masters, they seem to many Western observers to be surrendering their new powers just as fast as they can, not to the white overlords, but to their own black leaders.”
Absent from this discussion was the fact that the white holders of power had, for the past four hundred years, undermined the rule of law and effectively precluded the formation of stable African societies. The apartheid government regularly stoked racial tensions to preserve its power, even to the end of its rule.
The final way the apartheid regime clung to power was to exaggerate claims of a greater evil. For many in the West, the “inhumanity of the South African system, its perverse racism, was a lesser evil” than the spectre of communism. The apartheid government, and its powerful allies in the United States and the United Kingdom, considered the ANC a terrorist organisation sympathetic to communism. After the United Nations published a report advocating for the establishment of a ‘non-racial democracy’, South Africa accused it of bias for drawing on sources which it considered “communist-infiltrated or controlled”.
In 1952, Nelson Mandela was imprisoned for ‘statutory communism’. He would later face charges of ‘high treason’ and ‘conspiracy to violently overthrow the government’; the latter led to his famous imprisonment on Robben Island. In 2005, 11 years after apartheid was lifted, I had the honour of meeting him. Yet, he remained on the United States terror watchlist until 2008.
It is in this spirit that one should view the moral leadership of South Africa at the ICJ. In the words of Chief Albert Lutuli, a former President-General of the ANC: “Our history is one of opposition to domination, of protest and refusal to submit to tyranny.” The struggle for national rights in South Africa has a 300-year-old history. It continues today, as economic and social apartheid is dismantled in South Africa and it challenges Western imperialism.
Decolonisation is not an easy endeavour, but history shows that it is inevitable.