Just a few years ago, the prospect of a self-described Socialist winning the democratic ticket would have seemed preposterous. It was this view, now largely anachronistic, that prevented Vermont’s Sen. Bernie Sanders and his bid for the White House from being taken seriously. Yet, we were, almost all of us, utterly wrong. His increasingly momentous campaign has certainly shaken the all-time Democratic favoured, Hillary Clinton, especially after her landslide defeat in New Hampshire and the unexpected draw in Iowa. Even before these two debacles, the pressure was mounting, forcing Clinton to reconsider her views and move to the left, especially on the issue of minimum wage and on Wall Street regulation. Despite this, it is all over. Or at least it will soon be. The Nevada caucus showed Clinton’s strength and the cause of her future victory: the Mid-West and Southern states and their coloured minorities. In these two categories, Sanders seems unable to climb mount improbable and revert the situation as he has done in the East Coast, which appears to be by now a ‘Bernite’ stronghold. His lack of campaign funds and Super PAC sponsors, in this case, does not favour him either, especially in appealing to low-information voters in the deep South.

Until now, these factors did not suffice to bring the duel between the two to a premature end, making the race a thrilling but time-wasting head-to-head, but next Tuesday, they will. Coming up on the 1^st of March, ‘Super Tuesday’ will see a line-up of 11 states (plus residents abroad and American Samoa) and, you guessed it, they are disproportionately Southern. Ranging from Texas to the Clinton family’s historical stronghold and home state of Arkansas, the caucuses will be a bloodbath. As if this wasn’t enough, Southern States tend to present a disproportionate number of delegates per state, as Texas has almost ten times Vermont’s. By now, it should be clear where this is going. Sanders’ probable victories in Massachusetts and Vermont will mean nothing when juxtaposed to Clinton’s expected victories virtually everywhere else.

But Super Tuesday’s lacerations will not be limited to the sheer delegate numbers, as the media perception and coverage of the Sanders campaign will revert to its original state of dismissive disregard. Bundled with the lack of Super Delegates, and the widening delegate spread, currently sitting on a solid 502 to 70 in Clinton’s favour, the Sanders phenomena will be promptly dismissed, and the party will rally around Clinton and her name recognition. It is true that the Super Delegates’ support is not yet binding, and their endorsement can be changed at any time, as happened in 2008 when many defected to Obama’s camp. But the polling numbers do not justify such a rearrangement, especially considering Sanders’ alienation from the party leadership, from where the Super Delegates are picked. Again, at the cost of appearing redundant it must be said once more: it’s over, and it is time to clean up and go home.

While Clinton’s defeat is highly unlikely at this point, the Sanders campaign will not evaporate as did Jeb Bush’s. The reason is simple. Sanders does not count on the support of large donors which will de-fund his campaign in case of serious and unexpected political beatings, allowing him to carry on nevertheless,  and making him likely to stick around and give Clinton and her Super PAC donors heart palpitations. But this foreseeable panic will have to do more with Sanders’ extreme stances, by U.S. standards at least, and Hillary Clinton’s unmatched desire to make Bill her First lady. This said, the Sanders phenomena and presidential bid should not be quickly dismissed as a temporary phantasmagoria from which the Democrats were bound to wake up. Along with Trump, he was the political revelation of the race. It did stir up an astonishing enthusiasm in the American left; a body which nobody really thought existed. It did influence other candidates on both sides. It did pose a threat to the, otherwise unchallenged, Clinton; but, as of Tuesday, the use of the past tense will become imperative. 

As a second year French sole student who will have to take both translation and grammar papers in fourth year, you can imagine my feelings of surprise, outrage and frustration when I learnt of the recent changes to the French language, affecting roughly 2400 words, being implemented from the start of the 2016/17 academic year.

First things first, what is actually going to change?

• The deletion in some words of the hyphens.
• Circumflexes to be removed above the letter i and u in certain words.
• The bizarre removal of letters creating jarring new words. For example, the French for Onion: ‘Oignon‘ now becomes ‘Ognon‘, which looks like the name of a villain from Lord of the Rings.

The Académie Française, watchdogs of the French language, initially approved this set of reforms a staggering 26 years ago in 1990, but it is only now that they are being acted upon. It must be noted they are only ‘optional’- a laughable proposition on its own. How can a set of official spellings be optional? I mean it’s optional for me to spell anything wrong, but that doesn’t make it right does it?

Also why create this unnecessary confusion? If the aim is to improve learning, then we should be simplifying the process, not complicating it. Good spelling is about precision, a word is either spelt completely correctly, or it’s wrong. There’s not meant to be any middle ground, so having an optional ‘i’ in ‘oignon‘ is counter-intuitive and frankly bonkers.

The announcements provoked an enormous backlash amongst the French public, who were outraged by what they considered to be an attack on their language, culture and national heritage. On Twitter, the hash tag of #JeSuisCirconflexe was taken up in protest.

The only potentially valid argument in favour of these changes (brace yourselves for its subsequent dismantling), relates to France’s immigration problem, which has arguably never been so pressing. The lack of integration of new settlers into French society results in the creation of ethnic ghettos in the suburbs of major cities such as Paris and the infamous ‘banlieues‘ de Marseille. Since many of these people are coming to France with little or no knowledge of French, then surely making the language as easy as possible to learn will help them settle into mainstream French society and form a link with the culture, as opposed to what happens far too often; individual ethnic groups living together in small, insular communities and having very little interaction with the rest of French society, with many making no effort to learn the language. This is the perfect breeding ground for racial/ethical tension and more worryingly, extremist radicalisation, which is an ever-growing and very real problem being faced in the West.

However, changing a handful of words in an arbitrary manner won’t suddenly encourage people to engage with the rest of society and learn the national language. The problem lies in the social segregation and the atmosphere of tension, which is what the French government should be focusing on, rather than taking away the circumflex.

In response to criticism, the AF claimed the changes reflected an evolving language. This is a fair enough point, us British too aren’t shy of adding new words to our language. It was only last August that ‘ awesomesauce (adjective): extremely good; excellent’ (truly embarrassing) was added to the OED. Of course this is an intentionally bizarre example and I wouldn’t disagree that new words should be officially added to languages to keep them up to date, but changing words that have proudly stood for hundreds of years and have made up the backbone of countless works of literary greatness and cultural significance is an out-right attack, and doing so in the name of simplification is an insult to the French peoples’ intelligence.

All languages have idiosyncrasies, especially English; funny little rules that you only learn by getting wrong, and they’re something to cherish. I savour that little jolt of smug pleasure you feel when you hear someone getting something wrong that you had previously gotten wrong but learnt from it. Take ‘hanged’ for example – you say ‘the nasty villain was hanged’, not ‘he was hung’, it’s ‘hanged.’

Finally, poor spelling abilities could be blamed on the reduced importance placed on reading in our society, where everything is condensed to a 140-character tweet, with little attention paid to the spelling or grammar.

If I were in charge of the Oxford Modern Languages faculty, I would have released a formal statement, announcing that the faculty isn’t acknowledging these changes and is sticking to good old fashioned, traditional French. If it was good enough for Voltaire, it’s damn well good enough for me.

So, if the word ‘onion’ comes up in my finals translation paper, rest assured, I’ll be spelling it ‘oignon.’ 

Max Leak’s article published online in Cherwell the other day painted the Israeli-Arab conflict as a simple and monolithic issue of justice and equality vs. oppression and evil. To back up his point, Leak embarked on an ‘experiment’. He took an apartheid apology and replaced South Africa with Israel, and succeeded at getting it published in the OxStu. He claimed that this proved the worth of the apartheid analogy to Israel.

Leak’s experiment lacks any argumentative worth. This was a poor attempt to construct what he perceived as stereotypical ‘pro-Israel’ arguments, followed by the claim that these arguments were analogous to defences made against apartheid. It’s worth dealing with this first.

Leak’s article claimed that many of the arguments made by Israel’s defendants are the same as those made by apartheid apologists. He cites the following arguments:

‘We are told that the natives are barbarians who will slaughter their former rulers as soon as they get freedom; we are invited to look at a troubled region, and then at the little island of repressive stasis under discussion, and draw the conclusion that oppression works better than freedom in such a savage, unruly part of the world.’

Sure, there may be a small section of hardliners that may occasionally make these embarrassingly poor arguments. But if he ever cared to properly investigate what constitutes pro-Israel thought he would discover that this quite simply isn’t the case. Those who believe in Israel’s very existence (a bizarre claim to have to justify anyway) do so from a range of important normative positions.

The most common arguments in favour of Israel tend to fall into two categories. Firstly, many see Israel and Zionism as the fulfilment of Jewish collective rights to self-determination. The Jewish people, in an age of nation-states, sought to fulfil their own collective rights through creating a nation-state of their own through mass immigration to an ancient homeland. Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, others see Zionism as a vital refugee movement, providing one safe haven for Jews around the world in a period where anti-semitism led to a genocide from which the Jewish people still haven’t recovered. It is an argument that seems anachronistic, but yet in 2016 there is something of a Jewish Exodus from France to Israel.

I could go into these arguments in more depth. I’m sure Leak was well aware of them. He could have quoted pieces from student publication Zionish, or have looked at the output from liberal Zionist organisations Yachad or JStreet. He could have looked at the ideology of prominent early Zionists such as Ahad Ha’am, Be’er Borochov or Chaim Weizmann, or of Israeli political parties such as Meretz or the Zionist Union. But he undoubtedly chose to ignore these sources because they didn’t suit his pre-chosen narrative.

In short, Leak can only sustain his analogy with a weak parody of what arguments constitute ‘pro-Israel’ discourse. If he ever cared to talk to anyone who even remotely claimed to be ‘pro-Israel’, he would have realised this. Instead, he picked and chose from the dregs of the internet and hard-right organisations.

The absurdity of his argument is also worth pointing out. Because some people justified both A and B using the same argument, Leak claims that A and B must therefore be the same thing.

Well, to apply Leak’s argumentative structure to his own cause, let’s try this. Hamas, a brutal and deeply anti-Semitic terrorist organisation, uses anti-colonial rhetoric and the language of oppression in its screeds against Israel. Leak and other Palestinian solidarity activists also use anti-colonial rhetoric and the language of oppression in its opposition to Israel. Therefore, as justifications for Palestinian solidarity activism are the same as those used to justify anti-semitic terrorists, all Palestinian solidarity activism must be anti-semitic terrorism.

I’m sure Max will agree that this is ridiculous. In short, the only conclusion we can draw from Leak’s experiment is that a rushed OxStu student editor agreed to publish a poorly written and weakly argued opinion piece. Some ‘experiment’.

It’s also worth turning to the narrative that Leak seeks to promote. The author’s slander of all pro-Israel and Zionist discourse with the tag of apartheid apologetics is particularly awful. Fundamentally, it fails to reflect the reality of the situation. The distinction between Green Line Israel and the Occupied Territories is one which did not exist in South Africa. The Occupied Territories are not part of Israel; they are Palestinian land in which the Palestinians should form a sovereign state.

This is the reality of the situation that Max ignores when he describes Israel as apartheid. The plight of the Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories is an awful human tragedy, and should shame the state of Israel. The occupation must end. But to conflate this with green-line Israel is an astonishing claim. Palestinian citizens of Israel have the same rights as any other Israeli citizen in crucial areas – not least the vote. There is discrimination, sure, but to claim wholesale that Israel is an apartheid state is nothing short of intellectual fraud.

Leak’s fundamental narrative of the conflict is also worrying. In the last paragraph, he states that, ‘If you want to know about that struggle – if you want to know how you can be on the right side of it – come to our events at Israeli Apartheid Week, running Monday to Saturday of 6^th week.’

In my view, precisely the problem with much of the discussion around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is that it is an issue of ‘us and them’; two opposing sides and activists on either side must choose one side to place their flag. The idea there is a ‘right side’, that we must all stand with in uncritical solidarity, in a conflict as complex and nuanced as the Israeli-Palestinian one is laughable.

To say that one side is flawlessly moral and just, while the other is a den of racists and colonialists, is simply untrue. There are many problems in Israel, its society and its politics, I don’t deny that, and I’m sure you can learn about them at Israeli Apartheid Week. But Palestinian society and politics is hardly blameless. Israel is currently in a wave of random knife attacks, where elderly women are stabbed to death whilst walking down the street. Mahmoud Abbas was elected to a four year term in 2005 that he’s still serving, and Hamas is designated as a terrorist organisation by the EU and the USA.

Nor is each side monolithic. Many Zionists and Palestinian activists share criticisms of both the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. Many on both sides actively campaign for the two state solution. Leak’s conception of the conflict as a zero-sum game of good and evil is a dangerous one that threatens to alienate the moderates on both sides who are genuinely capable of making peace.

We should not restrict ourselves to blindly standing with one camp or the other. Many on both sides do this, including Max Leak. To claim that Israel can do no wrong, like some pro-Israel activists do, is misguided. But the opposite position is equally so. Max paints the conflict as a black and white issue, right vs wrong, justice vs apartheid. This is an unhelpful distortion of the realities of the conflict. I’m not asking anyone to view the conflict in 50:50 terms. But 100:0, in either direction, is ridiculous.

If we want a constructive discourse about the conflict that includes all voices, then it’s imperative to ditch worldviews which force activists into extreme positions. In Oxford, of all places, this is something we should strive for. 

Over the last week, the issue of the junior doctors contract has been eclipsed by the debate over Britain’s membership of the EU. Heated public debate always suffers from fatigue, and the media eventually run out of interesting photos to accompany their articles, so they move on. However, the dispute over the contract is still very much unresolved — negotiations have broken down and Jeremy Hunt is still trying to impose the new deal against hostile opposition from the BMA. So as we gaze into the future and wonder what will happen next, how do we begin to make sense of the mess?

It can be hard to see clearly through the blur of conflicting statements surrounding the proposed contract. Opposing groups often appearing to be talking about such different deals that is leads you to question whether they are even reading the same document. What is clear is that the debate has drawn incredibly strong emotions from both doctors and the public. With the first doctor strikes since 1975 and the risk of alienating an entire generation of junior doctors, the stakes could not be higher.

It is worth starting off by looking at the facts, but the devil is in the detail, and however anyone may try and put it, the contract is complicated. Will doctors get a pay cut? Well, probably not. Most junior doctors will either be paid more than they were this autumn, or the same amount, for at least three years. This is due to “pay protection” measures that were introduced to the contract in November, but doesn’t completely eliminate the possibility of some loosing out, particularly if their salary in the autumn was for some reason lower than usual. It is also true that the protected salary will not rise with experience or inflation, so their salary may end up lower than it hypothetically would have been and they get more experienced. It all gets even more complicated when you try to consider the huge variation in the out of hours patterns of different specialities.

Adding to the confusion is that there have been a number of different proposals made at different points in the negotiations. The proposals in July would have meant a pay cut for some junior doctors, but the NHS employers have stated that the deal put forward at that point was never considered perfect, but rather somewhere to start negotiations.

As devoted as the team at Cherwell is, it would be near impossible to try and apply the details of the deal to every single junior doctor to see whether they would be losing money, and it doesn’t get any easier when you turn to the big organisations for help. The BMA stand defiantly with their objection to the contract, and on the other side of the fence, Jeremy Hunt accuses them of misleading doctors. NHS Employers (firmly on the government’s side) talks about it positively, but they are drowned out by the numerous medical organisations who have come out against it. It is hard to get either side to put down an unbiased and systematic argument in their favour, and it therefore seems to boil down to a game of trust. As one would perhaps expect, the BMA current has the favour of the public.

It is also worth looking at the commonly quoted issue that patient safety will be compromised by the removal of the pay banding system for unsocial and its associated safeguards. Unsurprisingly, the camp is once again divided. The BMA argues that the removal of financial penalties for employers subjecting doctors to “fatiguing” work patterns will put patients at risk — The Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health and The Royal College of Obstetrics agree. NHS employers says that it is not these safeguards that are responsible for reducing working hours, but rather it is down to the European Working Time Directive.

All this talk of fact is beginning to make me weary, but it is also unlikely to help us in a dispute that is as much about sentiment as it is about details. The major factors contributing to this is the state of the current NHS, the way in which the government has gone about the negotiations, and suspicion over the motivations of the government.

The NHS is under huge strain, with rising patient numbers and shortages with regular staffing, to name but a few of its many symptoms. This has left many NHS staff, from consultants to GPs to junior doctors to nurses, feeling under immense stress and pressure. The changes in the healthcare system under the conservative government have created strong feelings of resentment towards the government and this has inevitably made negotiations difficult.

It is also impossible to ignore the actions of Mr Hunt in this debate. The fact that the negotiations have got to this point is a very poor reflection on his skills as a mediator, and at some points, his rhetoric has been outright misleading. This leads us to the greatest point of contention in this debate: the inclusion of Saturdays in what are considered ‘normal working hours’. The health secretary continues to claim that poor care on weekends is responsible for excess deaths, and that the solution to this is a 7 day NHS. This is misrepresentation of data. Although it is true that research suggests that there are ‘excess deaths’ at weekends, to claim that this is due to sub standard care is simply incorrect. There are many possible explanations for increased weekends deaths, for example those that wait until the weekend to go to hospital may be more unwell, and in the case of strokes (another claim recently made my Mr Hunt) it is possible that people who suffer less serious stokes on the weekend do not seek immediate treatment. As the researcher put it: “It is not possible to ascertain the extent to which these excess deaths may be preventable; to assume that they are avoidable would be rash and misleading”.

During the strikes, Mr Hunt also claimed that doctors were putting patients at risk by going on strike. Consultants covered much of the extra work and this attempt by the government to win over public support is not substantiated by evidence, nor is it agreed with by most medical organisations. Mr Hunt has also appeared to deliberately avoid debate with doctors over the issue, only increasing suspicion that he is unwilling and unable to defend his ambitions.

The suspicion among many health professionals is that this deal is the first step in a series of changes to all NHS employees that will gradually see the erosion of standard working hours and weekend pay in order to make it easier for hospitals to roster staff in the weekends. Junior doctors were perhaps the easiest targets for the government to start with, and the fear is that the continual ambition to make a 7 day NHS on the same funding as a 5 day one is only possible by making the staff cheaper. These feeling and resentment among junior doctors meant that the BMA has felt unable to move on this disagreement.

So, we can safely conclude that it is a mess. Short term ideology sailing on the prevailing economic winds continues to plague health policy (and let’s face it, this is politics, it always will) and the NHS continues to go from crisis to crisis. David Cameron has already tried to draw attention away from the dispute with a ‘new’ focus on mental health, and the EU debate is helping distract the press. Meanwhile, the BMA are still standing strong, and have recently announced they will be mounting a legal challenge against the imposition of the deal. So here is my prediction: the government will water down the contract as they realise that the fight isn’t really worth it, the new contract will go through and both sides will claim victory. Jeremy Hunt will be promoted to a cosy cabinet position as a thank you for withstanding the abuse, and all will be calm before the government think the time is right to push for another reform. Some doctors will leave the country, or leave the profession — how many is hard to say. The morale may increase for while (depending on the rhetoric surrounding the final deal), but otherwise continue as before and the NHS will continue to suffer the same problems that have been plaguing it for years.

I would argue that responsibility for this conflict mainly lies with the Department of Health, but neither side have acted in the most honest of manners. Whatever happens, having a health service workforce that is at odds with the government will help no one. This must change if the NHS is going to make any progress at a difficult time, and the duty lies on both sides to try and make it work.