The assassination of General Qasem Soleimani constitutes not only an escalation in tensions between the USA and Iran, but one of the most significant escalations in Middle Eastern politics for some time. Not only was Soleimani a revered war hero in Iran, but he was also intimate with the Iranian clerical leadership, heading the Quds Force, a subdivision of the highly trained, equipped and ideological Revolutionary Guard. His assassination is markedly different to the killing of al-Baghdadi or Naim Qassem, ex-leader and deputy leader respectively of ISIS and Hezbollah; the killing of a leading military figure of a sovereign country can, not unfairly, be interpreted as a declaration of war, however horrific his record.
Further, Iran’s influence throughout the Middle East is
heavily reliant upon Quds and the Revolutionary Guard. Over several decades,
the Iranian Ayatollahs have become extremely adept at covert warfare, funding, training and supporting terrorist
organisations throughout the Arab World in countries such as Yemen, Syria,
Lebanon, and Iraq. Multiple Iranian proxies were closely connected to the
recent protests which besieged the US embassy in Baghdad that began this course
of events. This bombing by America therefore is not some peripheral restraint
on Iranian economic interests but constitutes a direct attack on their most
efficient weapon on the international stage.
Already American citizens have been urged to withdraw from
Iraq entirely and told not to approach the Baghdad embassy. Numerous American
and international businesses operate within Iraq, whose production shall no
doubt suffer as a result. Further, they may see their own operations under
attack, seen by Iranian sympathisers and operators as proxies of US interests.
Though I suspect retaliation by Iran itself will likely target explicit
American and Israeli targets, wider Iranian sympathisers in Iraq may also turn
their anger towards western entities writ large. Let us not forget that
although certain elements within the Iraqi parliament are sympathetic towards
Iran, Iraq remains a needed ally of America. That American citizens are being urged
to leave a US ally is therefore a dramatic and sudden alteration in US-Iraqi
relations, and it shall be very interesting to see how the Iraqi government
responds to this unfolding event.
To stabilise their position, America has resorted to sending
a significant number of troops to Kuwait – 3000 thus far, though I suspect many
more could be sent within short notice. America will likely scramble to secure
vital interests within Iraq, as they simply cannot afford to completely abandon
their presence within the country. It is vitally important not only to checking
Iranian interests, but also to address issues in bordering Syria. If the Iraqi
government fulfils the request of the legislature to revoke the invitation to
America, US troops will also be forced to vacate Iraq, or be in breach of
international law. Their departure, along with other coalition forces helping
to mop up remnants of ISIS, would fundamentally change the precarious positions
of power between terrorist groups, Assad and Russian forces, and
coalition-backed entities in Iraq and Syria. This would likely be to Assad’s
gain.
America is not the only power responding to this event –
Iran has promised fire and brimstone for the assassination of a man they call a
national hero. Russia has been one of the few powers to explicitly admonish
America for the killing, but it’s unclear just how much they can do to respond.
Retaliation will therefore likely come in one of three potential forms:
firstly, directly by the Iranian regime and its Revolutionary Guard; secondly,
from associated Iranian-backed entities such as Hezbollah; and thirdly, from
disparate unorganised groups unaffiliated with any regime, likely in Iraq
itself. We should not be too quick, however, to portray all of Iraq’s population
as pro-Iran and as eager to take up arms against America. Iraq’s government had
previously come under great scrutiny for continued ties to Iran, including from
Iraq’s Shi’a population, and media organisations such as Al-Jazeera have
reported celebration at Soleimani’s killing, seen by some as a key meddler in
Iraqi affairs. Nonetheless, it is at least plausible that sections of the
general population in Iraq, and across the Middle East, will be impassioned by
this act.
A retaliatory strike through Hezbollah is a favoured Iranian
tactic. But I suspect it shan’t be seen as enough this time by the Iranian regime.
You can expect escalation from Iranian-backed organisations in Lebanon, Syria,
Yemen, and elsewhere, jeopardising not only the little political stability
present in such countries, but also the economic and political interests
of Saudi Arabia, Israel, and other US allies in the region. Sadly, it is almost
certain that such entities will respond with violence of some kind. If,
however, the Iranian response was limited to peripheral attacks through such
entities, Iran may worry that America would see this as a strategic win,
encouraging them to ramp up their actions against the Quds forces. In essence, if Iran does not respond with an
attack in kind, they may worry they come off as the loser in this engagement.
Finally, will some official Iranian entity attack United States
operatives? The number of interests the Ayatollah of Iran must now consider are
numerous – much of the Iranian population I will likely demand a swift and
powerful response. However the dramatic strength of the United States in the
Middle East (furthered through the new presence of troops in Kuwait and
southern Iraq) would make at least certain retaliatory strikes an almost
certainly failures. Iran may also be seeking advice from Russia, China and
others to see what options are open to them. A more successful route of attack
for Iran may be digital, making use of recent advancements in technological
warfare.
A likely site of tension is the Strait of Hormuz, shared between
Iran and the Gulf states. It was here that last year a British-flagged tanker
was seized, and the presence of Iranian, British, Saudi, American and smaller
Gulf nation militaries makes this region a likely source of conflict. While I
remain sceptical as to the potential for total war, some form of an economic
embargo at choke points by Iran could prove devastating to international oil
production and prices.
One outcome, of which I remain sceptical, is the potential for war à la Iraq 2003. In 2003, America faced a pariah state led by a secular leader with little domestic or international support, a military weakened after war with Iran, and a generally incapable leadership. In Iran, one finds a sizeable population, a highly efficient military force, not-insignificant levels of support for the state from the populace, and geographical constraints on potential invasion. Only the most hawkish of figures such as John Bolton consider direct regime change feasible, and with Trump also considering his domestic re-election, I doubt he shall consider war, which has become a vote loser I suspect since 2003. Of course, conflict can stop short of invasion, and as I have said, violence in Iraq or the Strait will itself constitute a worrisome escalation in affairs.
I’ll note that America’s assassination of Soleimani is not
necessarily an irrational display of aggression (I shall leave it to you
whether it can be justified or not). As I have said, the Revolutionary Guard
remains Iran’s best way of influencing affairs in the Middle East, and through
it, terrorist organisations have seen great success in limiting US influence in
important strategic regions. And though the US-Iran nuclear deal contained much
good it was wholly implausible that Iran would sacrifice its organisational and
military network which has afforded it so much regional influence. In the
absence of cooperation, any effective response to Iran would most naturally
take the form of retaliation against Quds. They are, as we have seen in the
Baghdad protests, capable of and willing
to, present violent threats to US personnel.
The killing of Soleimani is not comparable to prior instances of
escalation between Iran and America. It
is the single most brazen act of escalation America could have taken short of
an attack on Iranian soil. As such, the response one can expect from Iran
should be of similar proportions. Countries such as Great Britain are right thus
to urge for de-escalation, as Iran will no doubt respond in a very dangerous
manner. If we are to avoid an ever-worsening position now, America must work
very closely with its international allies to moderate its position, and Russia
should attempt to tame Iran’s response, though the extent to which it can is
questionable. One will likely see related conflict breaking out in Palestine or
Lebanon, as Israel is seen by Iran as an extension of US interests, and
Hezbollah figures were also assassinated alongside Soleimani. We must be wary
of the potential American response to the murder of an American soldier or citizen,
which is now an entirely plausible outcome, as it could further exacerbate
affairs beyond measure.
